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THE RIGHT TO A LAWYER:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT
Abe Krash*
Shortly before dawn on June 3, 1961, a police officer making his rounds
in Panama City, Florida, found the front door of the Bay Harbor Poolroom
ajar. He investigated and discovered that a window at the rear of the building
had been shattered; a cigarette machine and jukebox had apparently been
rifled.' A bystander informed the policeman that he had glanced through the
store window a short time before and had seen an acquaintance in the pool-
room. He identified the man as Clarence Earl Gideon.' On the basis of this
information, Gideon was arrested. He was subsequently indicted for "breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor," a felony under Florida law.
At the commencement of his trial, Gideon, who was indigent, rose and
asked the court "to appoint counsel to represent me in this trial. . .
The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by coun-
sel."' His application was denied by the trial judge on the grounds that "under
the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the court can appoint counsel to
represent a defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense." 4
A jury was then impaneled, and the case proceeded to trial. Gideon represented
himself. He examined several witnesses called in his behalf; he cross-examined
the state's witnesses; and he made a closing argument. He was found
guilty by the jury, and he was sentenced to five years' imprisonment, the maxi-
mum penalty under the applicable statute.
This episode - a commonplace in some state courts prior to March, 1963
-was the genesis of an historic decision by the Supreme Court respecting the
right of an accused person to the assistance of counsel.
Gideon was imprisoned in the Florida state penitentiary at Raiford. With-
out the assistance of counsel, he prepared a petition for habeas corpus which he
filed with the Florida Supreme Court. He claimed that refusal by the trial
court to appoint a lawyer to represent him violated his constitutional rights.
This petition was denied by the Florida Supreme Court without opinion.'
Gideon then personally sent a handwritten petition for certiorari and a
motion for leave to proceed in forma paupers to the United States Supreme
* Partner, Arnold, Fortas & Porter; member, District of Columbia Bar; A.B. Univ. of
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I should state that my colleague, Abe Fortas, was appointed by the United States Supreme
Court to represent Clarence Earl Gideon, and that I assisted him in preparation of the brief
in Gideon v. Wainwright. I bear sole responsibility for the views expressed in this article.
1 Transcript of Record, pp. 23-24, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 Id. at 17.
3 Id. at9.
4 Ibid.
5 Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961). H. G. Cochran, Jr., who was
Director of the Florida Division of Corrections during proceedings in the lower court and
at the time certiorari was granted, was succeeded by Louis L. Wainwright, prior to the United
States Supreme Court's decision and the style of the case was accordingly changed.
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Court. Hundreds of such petitions by prisoners pour into the Court6 ; few are
granted. Gideon's petition, however, was plucked out of this maelstrom, and,
on June 4, 1962, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and appointed counsel
to represent Gideon. In its order granting the petition, the Court took the un-
usual step of formulating the precise issue it wished to hear: "In addition to
other questions presented by this case, counsel are requested to discuss the fol-
lowing in their briefs and oral argument: 'Should this Court's holding in Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, be reconsidered?'"
In Betts, decided in 1942, the Court ruled, in a case closely analogous to
Gideon's, that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to appoint counsel
for an indigent criminal defendant only where there are special circumstances,
that is only where proceeding without a lawyer would be "offensive to the com-
mon and fundamental ideas of fairness."' From the day it was announced,
the special circumstances test was forcefully and repeatedly criticized, both by
individual justices and by commentators,' but it was the applicable standard
when Gideon was tried.
Two months after the oral argument in Gideon's case, on March 18,
1963, a unanimous Supreme Court held, "upon full reconsideration," that
Betts v. Brady should be overruled." Mr. Justice Black - the author of the
dissenting opinion in Betts - delivered the opinion for the Court in Gideon.
The assistance of counsel, he wrote, is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial."
The Court, he said flatly, "was wrong" when it concluded in Betts "that the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights"
covered by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 The special
circumstances test was jettisoned. Gideon's conviction was set aside as having
been rendered in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Justice Clark concurred separately.'3 He felt that a valid distinction could
not be drawn, as a matter of constitutional law, between capital and non-
capital cases. It followed, in his view, that since the states were required to
furnish counsel in a case where a death sentence could be imposed, they were
required to do so in all cases. Justice Harlan, also concurring separately, 4
pointed out that the special circumstances rule had been "substantially and
steadily eroded" by Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Betts, and it was
"no longer a reality." He felt that "To continue a rule which is honored by
6 During the October, 1961, term, when Gideon's petition was granted, 1282 matters
were listed on the Supreme Court's Miscellaneous Docket; the great bulk of these are peti-
tions filed pro se by prisoners, similar to Gideon's handwritten petition. See The Supreme
Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARv. L. REv. 78, 82 (1962).
7 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
8 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
9 See, e.g., Cohen and Griswold, N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1942, § IV, p. 6, col. 5, quoted
in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677, n. 1 (1948) (Douglas, J. dissenting); Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213,
230 (1958); Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
'The Most Pervasive Right' of an Accused, 30 U. Cnr. L. REv. 1 (1962).
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 Id. at 342.
12 Upon retrial, when he was represented by counsel, Gideon was acquitted. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 7, 1963, p. 56, col. 1.
13 372 U.S. at 347.
14 Id. at 349.
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this court only with lip service is not a healthy thing and in the long run will
do disservice to the federal system."' 5 Justice Douglas filed a concurring opinion
indicating his view that all of the Bill of Rights are enforceable against the states
under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 6
I
In considering the implications of the Gideon decision, it is helpful to ask
this preliminary question: Why did the Supreme Court decide the basic issue
presented by Gideon when it did - on March 18, 1963? The issue of the
absolute right to counsel in state criminal prosecutions had been involved in
numerous cases which came to the Court in the late forties and in the 1950's,
but the Court did not overrule Betts. It is true that the record in Gideon pre-
sented the question with great clarity. But the Court could have bypassed the
ultimate issue presented; it has a large measure of control over its docket and
over the manner in which it decides a case.
There are some who yield to the temptation to answer this question simply
in terms of changes during the past several years in the membership of the
Court. They point, for example, to the retirement of Justice Frankfurter, who
suffered a stroke in April, 1962, while Gideon's handwritten petition for cer-
tiorari was pending before the Court."T At that time Justice Frankfurter was
the only justice still sitting who had joined the majority in Betts v. Brady. He
had been a staunch champion of the "special circumstances" test,' 8 and he had
been a leading foe of the doctrine that all of the Bill of Rights are made appli-
cable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
An obvious flaw with the foregoing rationale is that the Gideon decision
was unanimous; several of the justices who frequently share Justice Frankfurter's
views of stare decisis and the proper role of the Supreme Court with respect to
state criminal procedure, voted in Gideon to overrule Betts v. Brady. Further,
there is no certainty by any means that Justice Frankfurter himself would not,
upon reconsideration, have joined in the result in Gideon, though quite pos-
sibly on grounds different from those delineated for the Court by Justice Black.
There are other factors which may account for the outcome in Gideon
more satisfactorily.
First, I believe that the Court had become convinced, by its own experi-
ence, that the existing rule governing the assignment of counsel in state criminal
prosecutions - the "special circumstances" test of Betts v. Brady - was simply
not a workable standard. The Court had made a valiant effort for two decades
to give content to the rule. But each decision led to new qualifications. The
list of "special circumstances" grew longer with each opinion,"° and there
15 Id. at 350-51.
16 Id. at 345.
17 Justice Frankfurter did not participate in any phase of the Gideon case. He retired
in August, 1962, prior to the oral argument and decision. See 83 Sup. Ct. XVIII (1962).
18 E.g., Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
19 E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (concurring opinion).
20 Among the many factors held relevant, for example, in deciding whether the pro-
ceeding was fundamentally unfair were the complexity of the statute under which the defendant
was prosecuted and the nature of the offense charged, McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109
(1961); illiteracy, Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); mental illness or mental
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seemed to be no end in sight to the flood of cases pouring in 'upon the Court
which raised this problem. In short, the "special circumstances" test was too am-
biguous; too subjective; too difficult to administer.
Second, "time ha[d] set its face," in Justice Clark's phrase,' against the
principal argument advanced by those who opposed requiring the states to
appoint counsel in every criminal case. It had been urged that such a rule
would be inconsistent with the demands of federalism, that is, with the power
of the states to prescribe their local court procedures.22 But at the time of the
Gideon decision, thirty-seven states expressly provided, in one form or another,
for the appointment of counsel in all felony cases.2 It was the general practice
in eight other states to furnish such assistance if requested.2 4 As of March, 1963,
therefore, there were only five laggard states which did not make provision for
appointment of counsel in all felony cases - Florida, Alabama, Mississippi,
and the two Carolinas. In brief, the argument that the Court would intrude
upon states' rights was sapped of vitality by the actual situation in the states.
Twenty-two states joined in filing an Amicus brief in the Gideon case ask-
ing the Supreme Court to overrule Betts v. Brady." I know of no parallel
for this extraordinary action - a request by nearly half the states that the Su-
preme Court impose a constitutional requirement upon the states in the field
of criminal justice. I believe the Court was impressed by the broad consensus
of opinion which had emerged in the states concerning the necessity for the
appointment of counsel in behalf of indigent defendants in criminal cases.
Indeed, experience had demonstrated that the Betts rule, far from ad-
vancing the interests of federalism, generated friction between state and federal
courts. Federal judges were continually asked to review state criminal convic-
tions entered in the absence of counsel in light of a vague and subjective stand-
ard. Little wonder that the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in cases involving
the right to counsel provoked the resentment of state judges!
Finally, and most fundamentally, the Court had become convinced that a
fair system of justice requires that every man have the assistance of a trained
spokesman, whether the trial occurs in a federal or state courthouse. As Justice
Black put it: "Reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adver-
sary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."2
The Gideon decision cannot be regarded as an isolated phenomenon. It is part
and parcel of the whole corpus of constitutional law relating to state criminal
procedure created by the Supreme Court during the past quarter of a century.
Gideon belongs in the company of the long list of Supreme Court decisions in
retardation, Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); youth of the accused, Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); the extent of the accused's prior experience with criminal
proceedings, Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); misconduct by the trial judge or prose-
cutor, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948). The foregoing list is by no means exhaustive.
21 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961).
22 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 668 (1948).
23 Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 'The
Most Pervasive Right' of an Accused, 30 U. CH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1962).
24 Id. at 18-19.
25 Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
26 372 U.S. at 344.
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recent years dealing with unreasonable searches and seizures, coerced confessions,
double jeopardy, illegal arrests, and cruel and unusual punishment. It became
firmly established in these cases that it was proper and appropriate for the Su-
preme Court to prescribe standards of fair procedure for state criminal prosecu-
tions2"; the Gideon decision builds upon this premise. The decision reflects the
present Supreme Court's deep and abiding concern with the problems of indi-
vidual rights and civil liberties. Viewed from an historical perspective, Gideon
is a by-product of the cold war - it stands as a notice that in the free world
no man shall be condemned to penal servitude without a lawyer to defend him.
II
I should like to turn next to the implications of the decision with respect
to the specific right involved: the right to counsel in state criminal cases.
The precise point of law decided in Gideon is that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires the states to furnish counsel to an indigent accused person at a
trial for a serious criminal offense where such aid is requested. But an opinion
by a unanimous court with respect to a fundamental constitutional right should
not, and cannot, be read literally and narrowly like a corporate trust indenture.
I believe it was the intent of the Court that its opinion should be construed lib-
erally and that the right should be granted generously.
First, there is an immediate, pressing issue as to whether the Gideon rule
applies restrospectively to a conviction which occurred before the Supreme
Court's decision in March, 1963.28 It has been reported that in Florida, for
example, of the 8,000 prisoners in the state's penal institutions, 4,542 were con-
victed without a lawyer, and by October, 1963, more than 3,000 of these
prisoners had filed petitions seeking review of their convictions on the authority
of Gideon.
29
Shortly after the opening of the October, 1963, term, the Supreme Court
remanded ten right-to-counsel cases to the Florida Supreme Court for recon-
sideration by that court in light of the Gideon decision." The cases all involved
convictions of unrepresented defendants which had occurred before Gideon
was decided by the Supreme Court. Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's
action. He felt that the entire question of the retroactive effect of a decision
changing an established rule of state criminal procedure should not be settled
by the Supreme Court without full-scale argument.
The point involved is one of those fascinating issues touching one's con-
ception of the nature of law upon which lawyers delight to dwell; it invites a
short comment.
27 See Allen. The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal justice,
8 D.PAUL L. REv. 213 (1958).
28 In the first state court decision reported subsequent to Gideon, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court said that a "reading of Gideon indicates that its application is prospective
rather than retroactive . . ." (Emphasis in original). The Court held Gideon inapplicable to
a defendant who pleaded guilty without counsel in 1931. Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v.
Banmiller, 410 Pa. 584, 189 A.2d 875 (1963). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found it unnecessary to pass on the retroactivity issue in Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 1
(4th Cir. 1963). The Michigan Supreme Court has held the Gideon rule applies retroactively.
In re Palmer, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2272 (Mich., Dec. 10, 1963).
29 Time Magazine, Oct. 18, 1963, p. 53.
30 Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 84 Sup. Ct. 80 (1963).
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From time to time, it has been suggested that a decision changing a con-
stitutional principle should apply only to future cases, except that the new rule
would govern the actual case decided. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Cardozo,
among others, have urged that it may be appropriate in some cases, for practical
reasons, to give only prospective effect to a ruling which changes the law." Pro-
ponents of this view assert in substance that the overruled case was deemed
sound when it was decided; that it has been overturned because circumstances
have changed; and that it is nonsense to indulge in the fiction that the super-
seded case was never "the law."
It has generally been assumed, however, that a decision which overrules
a point of federal constitutional law will be given retrospective effect. The
ruling that the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in all fed-
eral criminal prosecutions was applied retroactively,32 and in 1958 the Supreme
Court held that the principle of Griffin v. Illinois,"s decided in 1956, was ap-
plicable to a 1935 conviction." It must be noted, though, that the retroactiv-
ity issue was resolved in these cases without detailed discussion.
The basic question as to which there is disagreement is whether the Gideon
rule should apply to individuals convicted before Gideon's trial in 1961 who
did not have any petition pending in any court in March, 1963, when the
Supreme Court issued its opinion. Those who favor limiting the retroactive
impact of the Gideon decision, because of the practical consequences, probably
would agret that the new rule should apply to all cases involving the same issue
which were pending on the Supreme Court's docket in March, 1963. Obviously,
basic rights should not turn on the fortuitous circumstances of the Court's docket,
i.e., on the happenstance that one case rather than another is reached first for
oral argument and decision. It might also be conceded that the Gideon rule
should apply to all cases raising the right to counsel point which were awaiting
disposition in any state court or in any of the lower federal courts when Gideon
was decided by the Supreme Court, whatever the date of the conviction. Those
persons who favor limiting the retroactive reach of the case might also
acknowledge that the Gideon rule should be followed in any postconviction
proceeding involving any person tried after the date of Gideon's trial in the
Florida State Court in 1961." In other words, persons who feel that the decision
should not be given unlimited retroactive effect are not forced to the extreme
of saying that it should be given no retroactive effect; they can argue that in
Gideon the Supreme Court invalidated a 1961 conviction, and that the decision
should be regarded as creating a new rule from that date forward, but not
earlier.
31 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25-26 (1956) (Frankfurter, J. concurring); Great
Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932). Contrast the views
expressed by Justice Goldberg in Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 424 (1963) (dissenting
opinion), and by Judge Sobeloff in Jones v. Cunningham, 319 F.2d 1, 4 (4th Cir. 1963)(concurring opinion). See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional
Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 650 (1962).
32 See Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F.Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
33 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
34 Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
35 Cf. Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp
v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 650 (1962).
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My own view is that the decision should be given full retroactive effect.
The Supreme Court has said that it is unconstitutional for a state to convict a
person of a serious offense without a lawyer. To refuse complete retroactive ef-
fect would mean that persons would be held in prison pursuant to a procedure
which a unanimous Supreme Court has said violates the Constitution. Consider
the profound sense of injustice which would be generated by refusal to give
retroactive recognition to the decision! It is important not only that justice
be done, but that it appears to be done.
This conclusion is buttressed by Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
Gideon. "The fact is," he wrote, "the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt
break with its own well considered precedents." He felt that, in Gideon, the
Court was "returning to . . . old precedents" and "restor[ing] constitutional
principles established to achieve a fair system of justice."' 6 That is to say,
Justice Black rejects the notion that Gideon is an adaptation to changed cir-
cumstances - a common premise among persons who advocate giving a decision
only prospective effect or limiting its retroactive scope.
I am informed that fears by state authorities that retroactive application
would result in a general jail delivery have proved in practice to be fanciful.
Various prisoners seeking review of their convictions have been cautioned that,
upon retrial, a more severe sentence than was originally imposed could possibly
be meted out." In these circumstances, defense counsel have negotiated reduc-
tions in long-term sentences, but I understand that as of December- 1963, rela-
tively few prisoners had been released or retried.
It is, of course, possible that some prisoners will insist upon their right to
a new trial, and that it may be impossible for the prosecution, in view of the
passage of time, to prove a long past offense. Such prisoners will probably have
already served a substantial part of a long sentence. The possibility that some
prisoners may go free may be the price which must be paid for withholding a
fundamental right.
Second, I do not think that the Gideon decision can justifiably be re-
stricted to situations where the accused specifically requests that a lawyer be
appointed to help him - as Clarence Earl Gideon did. The Supreme Court did
not attach any significance whatever to that point. The trial judge has an
affirmative duty to satisfy himself by a meticulous and thorough examination
that the accused has not ignorantly or incompetently waived his right to
counsel.'8
Third, I believe it immaterial that Gideon pleaded innocence. The under-
lying logic of the case - the idea that a person cannot be judged fairly unless
he has an attorney - applies with equal force to a situation where the accused
elects to plead guilty. Such a defendant requires the guidance of counsel in
36 372 U.S. at 344.
37 See Robinson v. Johnston, 50 F.Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Robinson v. United
States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment successfully attacked
conviction for failure to appoint counsel; following retrial he was sentenced to death for the
same offense. The sentence was subsequently commuted. See HALL & GLUE05C, CASES ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 604 (1958).
38 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948).
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appreciating the implications of the plea and in connection with sentencing.39
Fourth, the principal questions which remain unresolved are whether counsel
must be furnished in all criminal cases, including prosecutions for misdemeanors
and petty offenses, and the point in time during criminal proceedings when
counsel must be furnished.
It has been urged that the scope of the right to counsel in state courts
under the Fourteenth Amendment should be the same as in the federal courts un-
der the Sixth Amendment.4" The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of
counsel "in all criminal prosecutions."'" The Supreme Court, however, has
never decided whether the right extends under this amendment in federal
prosecutions to misdemeanors and petty offenses, but a lower federal court has
held that misdemeanors are covered.2 The Criminal Justice Act of 1963 - a bill
proposed by the Department of Justice in order to implement the right to
counsel in federal courts - explicitly provides for assignment of counsel in
misdemeanor cases, but excludes petty offenses.43
An argument rooted in history has been made to support the conclusion
that the line where counsel must be furnished should be drawn at petty offenses.
The argument is based upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury . . ." The
Court has held that the right to jury trial secured by this provision does not
extend to crimes classified as "petty offenses" under the English common law
in 1787." * By parity of logic, it is said, the right to counsel in federal courts
would not extend to petty offenses, and it should not be obligatory upon the
states to do so under the Fourteenth Amendment.4
I believe that a man is entitled to the assistance of counsel in any case
where he may be punished by the state - in short, in all cases where he may
be deprived of life, or liberty, or property by criminal processes. It is true that
the Gideon case involved an offense which was characterized as a felony under
Florida law - Gideon was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. However,
in my view, the argument that the duty to furnish counsel is limited to felony
prosecutions is doomed to failure. Before Gideon, a distinction had been rec-
ognized between capital and noncapital offenses - there was an absolute duty
to furnish counsel in a case where a death sentence could be imposed, but in
all other cases the state's duty depended upon special circumstances. This dis-
tinction has been buried by the Gideon decision. The case supports the proposi-
39 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee to Study Defender
Systems, Equal Justice for the Accused 35-36 (1959).
40 This view was urged in effect by Justice Douglas, concurring in Gideon v. Wainwright.
Justice Harlan, however, in a concurring opinion, reiterated his view that there may be a
disparity between the constitutional obligations imposed upon the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the duty of the federal government under the Sixth Amendment.
41 The right of indigent defendants to assistance of counsel in federal criminal prosecu-
tions was established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
42 Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
43 See Hearings on Criminal Justice Act of 1963 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963).
44 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); see Frankfurter & Corcoran,
Petty Federal Offenses and The Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv.
917 (1926).
45 See Kamisar, Where to Draw the Line? 22 LEGAL Am BRIEF CASE 10 (1963).
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tion that the test of the right to counsel is not the severity of the penalty but the
need for legal assistance. A man charged with an offense classified as a mis-
demeanor or a petty offense, who can be imprisoned for six months, may need
the help of a lawyer very badly, indeed.
I do not believe the Supreme Court is insensitive to the point that providing
counsel to all indigents charged with misdemeanors or petty offenses presents
difficult practical problems. Good faith compliance with the Gideon decision,
however, requires that the states begin to consider and implement various solu-
tions to this matter. In this connection, it is important to point out that the
Supreme Court has not directed the states to adopt any specific system for provid-
ing counsel. A particular locality is free to adopt any plan for the appointment
of counsel which is consonant with the community's needs, preferences, and
resources, subject only to the requirement that the system adopted guarantee
effective legal aid.
The question of timing in connection with the appointment of counsel is,
of course, critical. It has frequently been remarked that the failure to provide
counsel at the preliminary stages of a prosecution is one of the most serious
deficiencies of present practice. Gideon involved the right to counsel at the
trial stage. In another case decided last term, the Supreme Court held that
the absence of counsel at a preliminary hearing voided the conviction of an
accused person who pleaded guilty at that time.4 6 The test which has been
evolved by the Court is whether the stage of the prosecution at which the
accused is not represented is "critical.""7
I believe that the right to an attorney should attach at the time of arrest.
That is the moment when the state assumes an adversary role. It is also the
time when an accused may be most in need of legal assistance.48 Some of the
most troublesome problems connected with the administration of criminal justice
would be substantially ameliorated if the right to counsel were held applicable
as of the moment of arrest. I need mention only the issue of coerced confessions
and the right to bail as examples.
There are, of course, very real practical problems in guaranteeing counsel
prior to the preliminary hearing. In large, urban centers, this problem might be
solved by a readily available public defender. But I can offer no ready solution
to this dilemma.
All of the questions discussed above existed in the great majority of the
states before Gideon was decided. Any state which required the appointment
of counsel had to determine whether the right applied to all cases or only to
felonies, when the right attached, whether it applied in cases where the accused
pleaded guilty, and so on. The Gideon decision provides a constitutional spur to
resolution of these problems by all of the states.
46 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
47 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961).
48 See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, op. cit. note 39 supra at p. 60.
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III
Finally, a word should be said about the broader constitutional implications
of Gideon. Specifically, the case has important ramifications in connection with
the historic controversy concerning the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
states. Further, I believe it represents a development of importance in the
attitude of the Supreme Court toward civil rights.
The Gideon case represents a notable victory for those who argue that
the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are applicable to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has adhered to the position that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate or absorb all of the Bill of
Rights.49 In speaking for the Court in Gideon, Justice Black - a leading advo-
cate of the "incorporation" or "absorption" theory - did not say that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Sixth Amendment.
Instead, Justice Black looked, consistently with orthodox theory, to the Sixth
Amendment, as a source or standard for determining whether a right was
"fundamental" to a fair trial and thus obligatory upon the states. Whatever
the dialectic, the fact remains that year by year, the list of rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights deemed "fundamental" and therefore enforceable against the
states has grown. Two years ago, the Court said that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the states
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment."° A year ago, the Court ruled that
the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment was covered
by the Fourteenth Amendment." And now the right to counsel- which the
federal government must provide under the Sixth Amendment - is applicable to
the states. Recently, the Court agreed to review a case in which reconsideration is
asked of the holding in Twining v. New Jersey52 that the Fifth Amendment's ban
on self-incrimination does not apply to the states." The Court is approaching the
point where most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights will be held binding
upon the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
I suggest further that the Gideon case represents an important state in the
evolution of the Court's attitude towards individual rights. The traditional idea
has been that the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are limitations
upon governmental action with respect to an individual. Government cannot
abridge freedom of speech or freedom of religion; the police cannot make
unreasonable searches and seizures; property cannot be taken without just
compensation; and so on. In other words, the constitutional provisions involved
have been viewed as preventing the government from taking away liberties, as
negative restraints on governmental actions.
In the Gideon case, however, the Court has held that the state has an
affirmative obligation to give or to do something in behalf of the indigent and
disadvantaged defendant. In this sense, the Gideon case is intimately related to
49 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See Henkin, 'Selective Incorporation' In
the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALa L. J. 74 (1963).
50 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
53 Malloy v. Hogan, 83 Sup. Ot. 1680 (1963).
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the decision of the Court in 1956 in Griffin v. Illinois,5" where the Court said
that indigent defendants must be afforded a transcript of record adequate for
appellate review. 5 This idea - the notion that the state must positively assist
disadvantaged persons - has become accepted in economic matters. It is an
idea which is slowly emerging in the field of civil liberties, particularly in criminal
proceedings. It is given momentum by the ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright.
A Supreme Court decision may be great - to quote Professor Allen of
the University of Chicago - "because it appears to capture the essence of an
era, because it epitomizes the tensions and social pathology of the period and,
at the same time, casts revealing light on its ideals and aspirations."56 Gideon
is a great case because, in the straightforward prose of Justice Black, the Supreme
Court has given significant expression to two of this country's deepest ideals and
aspirations - a fair trial and just treatment of the poor and disadvantaged.
54 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55 See also Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Hardy v. United States, 32
U.S.L. WEEK 4084 (S. Ct., Jan. 6, 1964).
56 Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 191 (1958).
